On Life, Choice and Religion: An Analysis on Don Marquis’ ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’.
Firstly, the perspective of Don Marquis over abortion is based on the immorality of killing, not of the fetus itself but of another human. His initial thought is simple and it starts with the assumption that it is wrong to kill, and with that, he means, to kill fully formed humans. But why is it wrong to kill another human? Not because it is an intrinsic cultural value that we have and is something canonized in our societies since the ancients. Marquis says that it is wrong to kill another human because if we do so, we will deprive the victim of the act, of all of the experiences, activities, or pleasures that life could give in the future, meaning that we will deprive that specific human of their future.
He states that:
“The change in my biological state does not by itself make killing me wrong. The effect of be? the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future personal life”.
So, the act of killing is wrong mainly because of the harm inflicted on the victim, not because of the effects of his or her death on others. The victim suffers the misfortune of premature death, and the loss of all their future life is imposed on them through that act.
Moreover, Marquis says that the victims that suffer this act, lose the value that they would come to have in the future because even though the victim is deprived of their immediate plans and pleasures, the act of killing someone would also deprive the victim of other plans and pleasures that they don’t currently value.
However, his argument does not rely on the thought that if it is wrong to kill persons, it is also wrong to kill potential persons. That is because the idea that Marquis uses is that of the deprivation of another human being’s valuable future, not of the so-called “personhood” aspect.
The psychological assumptions of personhood that many of the pro-choice activists agree with; that is, agreeing with the thought that “only persons have the right to life”; raises the question of the importance of why psychological characteristics should make a moral difference.
Thirdly, Marquis defines personhood with the perspective of Feinberg in his paper “Matters of Life and Death”. Feinberg says that “The characteristics that confer commonsense personhood are not arbitrary bases for rights and duties, such as race, sex or species membership; rather they are traits that make sense out of rights and duties and without which those moral attributes would have no point or function. It is because people are conscious; have a sense of their personal identities; have plans, goals, and projects; experience emotions; are liable to pains, anxieties, and frustrations; can reason and bargain”. So, we can state that the characteristics of “personhood” are not enough to define someone as a human being biologically.
Finally, Marquis’ perspective explains the evil of infanticide without difficulty. A newborn or a baby in the first weeks of life may not yet be self-conscious or possess the mental capacities or characteristics of human beings, but it certainly has a valuable future. So it would be wrong to kill it, as wrong as it would be to kill a fully formed human being, or it can be considered even worse, since the loss of a future with value tends to be greater in the case of the youngest. Therefore, we conclude that:
“The future of a normal fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, and activities, among other things, and that set is equal not only to that of the future of an adult human being but also to that of the future of a baby. Since the reason sufficient to explain why it is wrong to kill human beings after birth is a reason that also applies to fetuses, it follows that, from a moral perspective, abortion is prima facie profoundly wrong”.
Marquis’s perspective has a clear aspect of a theory based on Kant’s deontological theory on the categorical imperative, in other words, if a specific act can’t be universalized or it cannot be completed consistently, then it is morally wrong to do such an act. However, Marquis’ theory has exceptions.
If a fetus is disabled or doomed to be diseased to the point that it cannot be assigned a valuable future, abortion will be permissible. Obviously, in some circumstances, it will be very difficult to decide whether the disability or disease is serious enough to make abortion permissible, but some situations leave no room for doubt. Therefore it can’t be characterized as a deontological perspective on abortion.
The author’s position is strongly criticized by Ann E. Cudd in one of her papers published by The Journal of Philosophy where she states that Marquis’s argument is “Sensationalized Philosophy”. Cudd’s position is that there are two problems with the assumption that Marquis brings forward in his paper “Why abortion is immoral”.
The first question that arises from her work is the question of whether fetuses are things that hold any rights or whether we have obligations to them. She states that this perspective is philosophically and politically irresponsible, in the sense that the question about abortion involves two lives at least, and that there are rights bundled to the woman carrying the fetus that cannot be disregarded.
Cudd says that ignoring these rights, “makes about as much sense as considering the issue of the moral permissibility of killing adult, fully- conscious humans without considering the justification of self-defense”.
The second problem of Marquis’s theory according to Cudd is if these rights or obligations that are bundled with the woman carrying the fetus are prima facie or absolute. Marquis then assumes, according to Cudd, that the right of a future is essential and therefore absolute. It overrides all of the other rights and obligations of the woman that carries the fetus.
If a fetus is disabled or doomed to be diseased to the point that it cannot be assigned a valuable future, abortion will be permissible. Obviously, in some circumstances, it will be very difficult to decide whether the disability or disease is serious enough to make abortion permissible, but some situations leave no room for doubt. Therefore it can’t be characterized as a deontological perspective on abortion.
The author’s position is strongly criticized by Ann E. Cudd in one of her papers published by The Journal of Philosophy where she states that Marquis’s argument is “Sensationalized Philosophy”. Cudd’s position is that there are two problems with the assumption that Marquis brings forward in his paper “Why abortion is immoral”.
Thirdly, Ann E. Cudd concludes that the perspective of Marquis’s theory does not focus on the matter of abortion, because it disregards indispensable rights and obligations towards the mother such as privacy, health, and medical care that are, according to her, essential to this discussion.
Personally, as a Christian and liberal, I believe in the basic right of freedom for all and scientific knowledge, however, my position on this delicate matter is very unresolved. Marquis’s position on the wrongness of killing a human being for the simple fact that the consequence of that act will deprive him or her of their future is the reason for my indecisiveness.
I come to an intersection because Christian Ethics states that the fetus is not a fully formed life. It is indeed controversial, but these ethics state that if the life of the woman is in danger due to the pregnancy, we should save the woman’s life, therefore there is permission for abortion. This is called the Theory of Double Effect. It is important to state also that the intention of Christian Ethics on this is not to kill the fetus but save the mother therefore it can’t be considered an evil act.
This opens up a precedent that states that the mother’s life is more valuable than the fetus’s life because the mother is a full life form whereas the fetus is still a developing life form.
So, if the fetus is a developing life form, can it be considered a human being? Or is it recognized as a life form like all others? Christian Ethics will say that it is a life form like all others. Marquis would say that if the fetus has biological characteristics of the human being then the fetus is a human being. But if the fetus isn’t a human being, according to Christian ethics, does it mean that it does not have a future? Marquis would say that if it isn’t a human being it doesn’t have a future. Thus, the question stands on whether to consider that abortion can be a moral or immoral act.
Christian Ethics also do not have in their regard the rights and the free will of the woman. So as Ann E. Cudd says, we consider that before the woman was pregnant she had all rights like everyone else in society, but as soon as she is pregnant, her rights must change. That, in Cudd’s perspective, is wrong because she is still a member of society and she still pays taxes. Also if we deprive her of those rights as an individual of a society, aren’t we depriving the woman of experiences and plans, therefore her future?
These questions, in my view, are still unresolved when it comes to abortion. The main question for the future, with the advance in technology, will be to discover in fact where life starts, and if that life can already be considered human life. Although my faith remains strong, my mind on moral taboos like these still consumes me and increases my will to go deeper into these moral issues, because I believe that faith and science can walk together to make the world a better place, and maybe someday, resolve these matters.
